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Abstract. The article aims to analyse the relationship 
between President Trump’s new policies, Brexit and 
the crisis of the liberal international order. The author’s 
main hypothesis is that the current liberal order is in 
serious crisis. While Brexit may be described as the 
biggest change in European politics since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, it is argued that Trump’s new foreign 
policy is the most important change in world politics 
since the Second World War. President Trump is the 
first American President since then to: 1) choose moder-
ate isolation over cooperation and multilateralism; 2) 
not promote democracy as a vital feature of US foreign 
policy; 3) be actively hostile to liberal internationalism; 
and 4) hold different views to his predecessors on the 
issues of trade, alliances, the environment, and interna-
tional law. The author concludes that the world is head-
ing towards a new international order that features the 
USA, China and Russia as the key players. 
Keywords: liberal international order, crisis of democ-
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Introduction
Most Western analysts and scholars agree that after more than half a 
century the liberal international order is today in serious crisis (Ikenberry, 
2018; Haass, 2019). Moreover, the crisis was already evident 20 years ago, 
following the terrorist attack on the USA, including the misguided Western 
policy on the Middle East and the ever more pronounced internal economic 
and political crisis in major Western countries that has seen the Western 
model of liberal democracy and international relations lose much of its 
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attractiveness. The extent to which its attractiveness has been lost will be 
seen in the years and decades to come. 
Following the Second World War, the world has been dominated by a 
liberal world order spearheaded by the USA. Although it was predominant 
during the Cold War, this order constantly faced security and ideological 
challenges mostly from the biggest communist countries: the Soviet Union 
and China. Its primary features included the USA’s economic and political 
domination, free trade, a market economy, liberal democracy and security 
cooperation among Western countries within NATO. Consistent with the 
politically dominant theory of liberalism, the USA believed that economic 
openness would be conducive to general prosperity, while democratisa-
tion and the protection of human rights would lead to a more just society 
and efficient international cooperation, thereby facilitating its global dom-
ination (Sullivan, 2018: 15). At the end of the 1990s, it appeared to many 
scholars and analysts that the world was irreversibly and unstoppably mov-
ing towards progress and democratic and liberal values. Huntington’s “The 
Third Wave” and Fukuyama’s “The End of History” spoke of the ascendency 
of democracy and the liberal international order. 
However, just one decade following the end of the Cold War and the tri-
umph of the West, the unsuccessful military campaigns waged by Western 
forces in the Middle East coupled with the great economic crisis of 2008 
raised questions about the claims about the end of history and the trium-
phant Western liberal order. Donald Trump’s victory in the USA and Brexit 
in the United Kingdom announced the end of an almost two-decade transi-
tional period marred by several foreign policy mistakes and a growing num-
ber of problems in Western democracies. 
The intention of this article is to point out the dramatic changes in global 
politics following President Trump’s election victory and Brexit as well as to 
analyse the crisis of the current ruling liberal world order. Second, certain 
key elements of the UK’s new foreign policy after Brexit will be examined. 
Third, we try to identify the internal and external causes of these changes. 
Theoretical and methodological framework
A large number of political scientists considering such tectonic changes 
in global politics base their analyses on the opposing liberalism and realism 
theories. Those advocating a liberal approach to international relations pro-
mote the principles of free trade, multilateralism, promotion of democracy 
and protection of human rights (Doyle, 1986; Desch, 2008). For the repre-
sentatives of this liberal school of thought, the main goal of US foreign pol-
icy, as the leading world power, is to turn as many countries as possible into 
a liberal democracy. It has constituted a way of protecting human rights and 
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fostering American hegemony across the world. However, Mearsheimer, a 
leading contemporary proponent of the realism school of thought, states 
that this “conventional wisdom is wrong”. “Great powers are rarely in a posi-
tion to pursue a full-scale liberal foreign policy… great powers of all per-
suasions care deeply about their survival, and there is always the danger in 
a bipolar or multipolar system that they will be attacked by another great 
power” (Mearsheimer, 2018: 1–2). Adherents to the realist school of thought 
consider that in foreign policy states should foremost be guided by their 
national interests. Mearsheimer claims that the USA, following the liberal-
ism theory, has wrongfully and harmfully to their own interests promoted 
liberal democracy around the world. He claims that, instead of spreading 
democracy, the USA has undermined peace and human rights on a global 
scale. Accordingly, he urges the USA to return to much more limited foreign 
policy goals based on nationalism and realism in its relations with other 
countries, especially with the major world powers of China and Russia.
In addition to the main dichotomy between liberalism and realism, one 
encounters other confronting theories and concepts dealing with modern 
world affairs created by Trump’s victory and Brexit. The USA elected a presi-
dent who is opposed to traditional American views on crucial foreign policy 
issues like liberal vs illiberal hegemony, protectionism vs free trade, multilat-
eralism vs bilateralism or the balance of power. 
In the post-Second World War period, in line with its interests as well 
as liberal hegemony theory, the USA has sought to create an international 
system based on multilateralism, free trade, international law, and alliances 
(Ikenberry, 2018: 7–9; Nye, 2019: 63–67). However, some analysts contend 
that following Trump’s election victory the USA has ushered in a new strat-
egy which they label illiberal hegemony. Thus, for example, Posen claims 
that Trump has taken much of the ‘liberal’ out of ‘liberal hegemony’, chiefly 
in reference to his giving up of the promotion of democracy and free trade. 
Yet, the USA still seeks to “retain its superior economic and military capabil-
ity and role as security arbiter for most regions of the world” (Posen, 2018: 
20–21). In line with liberal theory, free trade has been crucially important 
for the economic development of both the USA and Europe (John Ruggie, 
1982). Nevertheless, President Trump has challenged this important princi-
ple of the liberal world order and theory by promoting an “America First” 
policy, imposing tariffs on other countries, abandoning the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement, weakening the WTO and quitting certain trade 
agreements signed by the previous administration, thereby seeing a return 
to the USA’s protectionist policies from almost a century ago (Bremmer, 
2018: 101–106; Johnson, 2018). He is also the first US president since the 
1930s to have questioned the policy and theory of multilateralism. This 
concept was prominent in US policies after the Second World War and 
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was based on the assumption that building permanent international institu-
tions was the best way for states to communicate and manage world peace 
(Russett and O’Neal, 2011). Such international institutions were also sup-
posed to enable closer ties and relations between the USA and its allies. The 
USA had pursued this position ever since Wilson’s Presidency, who believed 
that the “league of nations based on a collective security pact against aggres-
sors would be more peaceful and just than a cynical alliance required to 
balance power” (Nye, 2019: 65). President Trump abandoned this theory, 
instead opting to develop bilateral economic and political relations with 
other states in the belief that this approach is more beneficial to US interests. 
It is hence no surprise that he so fervently supported the UK in its efforts 
to leave the European Union. Brexit itself is part of the same process in 
which leading Western countries, namely the USA and the UK, are giving 
up on the concept of multilateralism. To what extent the UK will succeed in 
compensating for its economic and political losses in the wake of leaving 
the EU by entering into new bilateral trade agreements with countries like 
the USA, Australia and Canada remains to be seen. An even bigger ques-
tion is whether the UK, once out of the EU, will manage to fulfil its inten-
tion of retaining its major role in the international political scene. Answers 
to these questions will not only be interesting from the point of view of 
political practice but also for theory, which hitherto has largely maintained 
that on this issue multilateralism brings unquestionable benefits to states as 
opposed to a bilateral approach. The same is true of the free-trade theory 
compared to protectionism (Ikenberry, 2018: 14–16).
Since in line with liberal theory (Doyle, 2005: 463) multilateralism’s main 
goal was to preserve peace, the question arises of what can possibly replace 
international organisations in their role of connecting states and preserving 
peace. Judging from President Trump’s statements, some of that role should 
be taken over by three leading world powers: the USA, China and Russia, 
whose relations would be based on their power. However, history teaches 
us that a world based on a balance of power among big powers easily 
slides into conflict and war. The dramatic rise in conflicts in northern Syria 
between Russia, Turkey and Iran following the USA’s withdrawal clearly 
shows that the balance of power among great powers is a changeable cate-
gory and that former allies, like Turkey and Russia, can easily become rivals. 
Haass therefore warns that an alternative to the current order is a “world 
with little order – a world of deeper disarray. Protectionism, nationalism 
and populism would gain while democracy would lose. Conflicts within 
and across borders would become more common and rivalry between the 
great powers would increase” (Haass, 2019: 30).
In this article changes in the liberal world order are analysed using 
the case study method. This method means that one or a smaller number 
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of cases are studied in detail while relying on theory and triangulated 
methods. 
In brief, the case study method allows investigators to retain holistic 
and meaningful characteristic of real-life events – such as individual 
life cycles, small group behaviors, organizational and managerial pro-
cesses, neighborhood change, school performance, international rela-
tions, and the maturation of industries. (Yin, 2009: 4)
Apart from the case study presented in this article, various theoretical 
arguments and statistics (economic) data are to be analysed and compared. 
The main focus is a comparative analysis of President Trump’s new foreign 
policy and the case of Brexit as seen within the historical context of crisis of 
the liberal international order. We also highlight similarities and differences 
between these two cases as part of the same historical process. An analysis 
is also undertaken of commentary provided by the most important political 
actors in international relations at the start of the 21st century.
Trump’s victory and the end of the liberal international order?
The unipolar world that developed post Cold War and was based on 
absolute US domination is slowly disappearing. The USA and Europe, two 
key pillars of that world, are losing steam politically and economically. The 
former is abandoning its previous role in world politics while the UK is leav-
ing the EU. “We seem to be entering an uncertain post-Anglo-Saxon world 
in which China and India will emerge as superpowers, while Russia and 
other emerging markets like Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey and 
Vietnam will also play important role” (Rašković, Vuchkovski and Svetličič, 
2019: 351). The weakening of their position begs a critical question: does 
the end of the unipolar world also imply the end of the liberal world order 
established after the Second World War, characterised by years of economic 
prosperity, liberal democracy, a global rise in living standards and the 
unprecedented advancement of science and technology? 
The key problem is that both the liberal international order and democ-
racy find it ever more difficult to offer a proper response to the problems 
of the world, thus questioning their own legitimacy, leading many analysts 
to conclude we are witnessing the end of the liberal international order 
(Mishra, 2017). Those less pessimistic place a question mark at the end: “The 
end of liberal international order?” (Ikenberry, 2018: 7). 
Brexit and Trump’s election victory have considerably altered the situ-
ation in international relations and world politics. President Trump is the 
first US President since the Second World War to question the biggest 
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elements of the liberal international order, such as the principles of free 
trade, economic openness, multilateral institutions, solidarity and security. 
Instead of joining international organisations and associations, the USA has 
chosen to leave them and replaced solidarity with moderate isolation. In a 
statement given at the UN General Assembly in September 2019, President 
Trump made it clear he was against the current globalisation concept which 
dominates and that the future belongs to patriots. “The future belongs to 
sovereign and independent nations who protect their citizens, respect their 
neighbors, and honor the differences that make each country special and 
unique” (74th Session of the UN GA, 2019).
Instead of the policy previously based on a belief in the USA’s “mission-
ary” role, President Trump asserts that US foreign policy must be based 
on a simple cost-benefit calculation. This means America will only engage 
when its immediate interests are at stake. Preferring a policy of bilateral eco-
nomic and political relations over a multilateral approach, in just the first 
year of President Trump’s presidency the USA abandoned the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement that had brought together 12 close American allies 
like Chile, Canada, Australia and Japan, and been signed by the previous 
administration. In March 2018, the USA imposed a 25% tariff on steel, and a 
10% on aluminium imports. Only the USA’s closest neighbours Mexico and 
Canada were exempted from this decision. President Trump also cancelled 
many Obama-era regulations connected with climate change that he saw 
as directly affecting the economic interests of US workers while announc-
ing the USA’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. According to President Trump, the agreement 
favoured foreign states and companies and was against the interests of 
America and its citizens. Moreover, the President asked NATO member states 
to increase their defence spending and warned that if this did not occur the 
USA might leave the organisation that has been a linchpin of US foreign 
and security policy for the past 70 years. Immediately after assuming office, 
Trump enacted several executive orders introducing a visa ban on citizens 
originating from seven Muslim countries on account of the danger of terror-
ism. In addition, despite objections by his closest associates, he abandoned 
the Iranian nuclear deal. China in particular came under President Trump’s 
attack who had accused it of unfair competition practices, currency manipu-
lation and intellectual property theft. For these reasons, President Trump 
imposed high taxes on Chinese imported goods to America and repeatedly 
called on US companies to leave China and come home. This new policy 
culminated in his decision to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem, a process 
alienating America from most countries in the world that voted against this 
decision in the United Nations despite his threats. Even some of the USA’s 
closest allies like France and Germany voted against.
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For the first time in 70 years, the promotion of democracy and human 
rights around the globe was no longer a priority of the greatest world 
power, nor an interest of its citizens. “Trump is an idiosyncratic realist who 
focuses on a narrow definition of American national interests and down-
plays democracy as a source of American soft power” (Nye, 2019: 68). Back 
in 2013, according to Larry Diamond, the Pew Survey suggested that even 
80 per cent of Americans agreed that the USA should not be concerned 
with global issues and should instead focus on their problems at home 
(Diamond, 2016). Trump believed that the USA’s past efforts to promote 
and build democracies around the world had been costly and unsuccessful 
and he therefore rejected the concept of promoting democracy as a goal of 
his foreign policy.
Taking stock of Trump’s policies in terms of the opposing theories dis-
cussed earlier, it could be said that almost all aspects of the US President’s 
new policy fall fully within concepts opposed to liberal views. He opted for 
a policy of illiberal hegemony, protectionism, bilateralism, a new balance 
of power between the great powers and is very close to what Mearsheimer 
labels the theory and politics of realism and nationalism. Therefore, 
Mearsheimer rightfully claims that Trump has brought into question vari-
ous aspects of liberal hegemony: “reminding voters time after time that it 
had been bad for America. Most importantly, he promised that if he were 
elected president, the United States would get out of the business of spread-
ing democracy around the world” (Mearsheimer, 2018: 230). The platform 
that propelled Trump and Brexit to victory was the same – America First 
and UK First. In his presidential campaign, President Trump even prom-
ised he would build a wall with Mexico to protect the country from illegal 
immigrants, while the biggest reason for the UK leaving the EU was a fear 
of immigrants, especially from new EU members that are former socialist 
countries (Pribićević, 2018: 200). 
However, even the harshest critics of Trump’s foreign policy, who mainly 
advocate liberal concepts, agree that the USA’s withdrawal from the global 
scene did not commence with his coming to power and that it will also 
not end with his departure. “The crisis of the United States’s post-Cold War 
foreign policy has been a long time in the making and it will last beyond 
Trump” (Cohen, 2019: 138). Some authors suggest that the USA’s withdrawal 
from global politics started as early as with President Obama’s administra-
tion. In his 2015 National Security Strategy, President Obama advocated 
US intervention only when his country’s lasting national interests were at 
stake. “Neo-conservative critics”, according to Joseph Nye, “saw more simi-
larity than difference in Trump’s and Obama’s” strategies (Nye, 2019: 70). 
Professor of international relations Barry Posen emphasises that Trump is 
not an isolationist and that he seeks to have the USA maintain both its role 
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as a guardian of world security and its superior economic and military posi-
tion, but that he has given up promoting democracy and abandoned many 
multilateral trade agreements. Posen claims that Trump remains commit-
ted to the geopolitical struggle together with other great powers and has 
kept many alliances inherited from previous administrations. To support 
his claim that Trump is not an isolationist, Posen refers to his conflict rela-
tions with North Korea, the continued war with the Taliban and ISIS in Iraq 
and Syria, including the delivery of anti-tank missiles to Ukraine. This new 
model of international relations Trump advocates is called the concept of 
“illiberal hegemony” (Posen, 2018: 20–21). 
Even though some other analysts also claim that Trump’s foreign policy 
is not so isolationist or that much different from the previous one, given 
the examples of Syria, Afghanistan and Russia (Stokes, 2018: 136) while 
noting the novelties introduced by the Trump Administration previously 
discussed, according to us there is no question that this is a major U-turn 
in US foreign policy compared to the last 70 years. A good illustration of 
this is the warning given by German Chancellor Merkel who, after meet-
ing with President Trump, announced that the old world order was gone, 
that the time of an unquestionable alliance with the USA was a thing of the 
past, and that Europe would have to fight for its own future itself (Merkel, 
2019). Those supporting Trump and his policies would argue that what 
German Chancellor said was actually what they wanted in the first place – 
Europe and other countries like Japan should be more concerned with their 
own security and safety and pay more, with less financial assistance from 
America. 
When on 7 October 2019 President Trump decided that US troops would 
leave northern Syria, this merely confirmed his resolve to break up with 
the foreign policy his predecessors had pursued for over half a century. 
President Trump declared it was time for the USA to extricate itself from 
ridiculous endless wars and leave Turkey, Europe, Syria, Iraq, Iran and the 
Kurds to deal with the problems in Syria (Trump, 2019). On the occasion, 
President Trump added that the USA would not defend its allies the Kurds 
from Turkish attacks, which led to Turkish troops entering northern Syria. 
Of course, President Trump’s decision immediately raised the issue of US 
loyalty to other allies around the world and made it clear that America had 
abandoned its former foreign policy. 
Still, due to the overwhelming pressure of the media and his political 
opponents, relations with Russia remain one of the rare foreign policy 
issues for which Trump has continued in the footsteps of his predeces-
sors (Abrams, 2019: 131–132). He condemned Russia’s military operations 
in Syria, the arrests of demonstrators in Moscow, stating that he expected 
Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine and extended the sanctions against 
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Moscow. On 2 August 2019, he withdrew from the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty. In his State of the Union address, after one year in 
the White House, President Trump singled out Russia and China as the two 
biggest rivals that challenge America’s interests, economy and values. The 
conflict in connection with the internal turmoil in Venezuela in 2019 only 
further exacerbated the relations between the two powers. By all accounts, 
it would appear that the future relationship of these two states will largely 
depend on their internal political relations. If President Trump wins a sec-
ond mandate, one may realistically expect him to try to improve relations 
with Russia as he wished and promised during his 2016 presidential cam-
paign. 
In addition to the above-mentioned issues, one can expect that in the 
years to come US foreign policy will focus on relations with China, North 
Korea, Iran and the fight against Islamic extremism. Two pillars of the USA’s 
Middle East policy will be Israel and Saudi Arabia while at the same time 
more turbulence can be expected in its relations with Turkey. 
The British reluctant to follow Washington’s new political course
Important changes also took place in the other major Western power – 
the United Kingdom, with a very similar political pretext as the changes in 
the United States. 
President Trump has made statements that, if affected upon, would 
effectively bring to an end America’s role as leader of the liberal world 
order. Simultaneously, Britain’s decision to leave the EU, and a myriad 
other troubles besetting Europe, appear to mark an end to the long post-
war project of building a greater union. (Ikenberry, 2018: 7) 
In fact, Brexit and Trump are part of the same political trend signify-
ing the wish of two major western powers to pursue independent political 
steps (unconstrained by international institutions and organisations like the 
UN, WTO, NATO, and the EU) aimed at cutting the financial costs of their 
current role in the international political scene. The difference is that US 
President Trump has openly questioned the liberal international order and 
globalisation while the UK has left the EU with a view to assuming a new 
global role with the USA’s assistance, but without questioning the existing 
liberal international order. 
After 50 years, the UK decided to leave the EU and is attempting to act 
independently in international politics. The greatest consequence of Brexit 
at the level of international relations is that for the first time in half a century 
a process of disintegration was underway within the European community. 
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The post-Second World War period had been characterised by processes 
to integrate and establish common institutions, whereas today we face a 
reverse process. 
Despite Brexit, both the UK and the EU will seek to maintain close rela-
tions not only due to their many shared interests, primarily in the field of 
defence and security, but also due to their shared values (Whitman, 2019). 
After leaving the EU, the UK will have less of an influence on the political 
situation in Ukraine, northern Africa, the Balkans and Turkey. However, 
the UK’s shrinking role started even before Brexit, initially in connection 
with the Ukraine crisis where France and Germany assumed leadership 
roles and in the Balkans where Germany took over. Outside Europe, the 
UK will continue to play an important role given its status as a permanent 
UN Security Council member, the international political culture, the UK’s 
colonial past and its nuclear weapons arsenal. Still, some authors (Gifkins, 
Jarvis and Ralph, 2019) already claim that after Brexit even its influence in 
the UN might come into doubt. Like before, the UK’s foreign policy priori-
ties will be its relations with the USA, the Commonwealth, Southern Asia 
(especially Afghanistan and Pakistan), the regions of sub-Sahara, the Gulf 
and Asia/Pacific. 
As the UK separates from the European Union, its relationship with the 
USA will be critical. Given his negative view on supra-national organisations, 
President Trump was a strong supporter of the UK’s decision to leave the 
EU. On the other hand, Trump’s victory has placed the UK in a new position 
because upon leaving the EU London is looking for a new role to play in 
the world while the USA has chosen a different role that may be defined as 
moderate withdrawal from global politics. Therefore, unlike the UK which 
is seeking to restore its global role in international politics, President Trump 
has time and again openly expressed his opposition to the globalisation 
policies discussed earlier. This policy of President Trump puts the UK in a 
very precarious position since London has counted on the USA’s support as 
its most important economic and political partner to revive its global role. 
On top of this, while Trump has wholeheartedly supported the UK leaving 
the EU, Britain will become less important to the USA since London can 
no longer serve as a major instrument of America’s influence within the EU 
(Pribićević, 2019: 151). Further, the international framework for the UK’s 
activities is today less favourable than it was 10 or 20 years ago. China is 
today economically stronger while Russia has largely managed to return to 
the global political scene. 
Despite a considerable number of the British political elite, intellectu-
als and journalists expressing great reservations about the policies of the 
new US President, especially his attitude to the Muslim population, Russia 
and the basic principles of liberal society upon which Western civilisation 
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has rested over the past decades, following Brexit, the UK pragmatically, 
although reluctantly opted to follow Washington’s new course. On the 
other hand, the UK was fully in support of Trump’s fight against Muslim 
extremism and his demand that NATO countries contribute their fair share 
and spend at least 2 per cent of their GDP on their defence. 
The arrival of Boris Johnson as new British prime minister in July 2019 
and the powerful support he was given by President Trump certainly war-
rants a consideration of the emerging closeness between the two countries, 
especially in trade and security. Moreover, despite its decision to leave the 
EU, with Boris Johnson as prime minister the UK, as the USA’s closest ally, 
will be able to align itself with Washington as a third major global factor 
along with China and Russia. Still, Great Britain will hardly be able to com-
pensate for the loss of an important instrument of its foreign policy, its 
economic and financial power, when outside of the EU (Pribićević, 2018: 
204–205). It also remains to be seen how the UK will harmonise its strategy 
with Trump’s policy of leaving the negotiations with Iran, the relocation of 
the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the relations with Russia and China. The 
UK and the USA do not hold the same positions on such issues and it might 
be said that the UK remains closer to the EU it just left than to the USA with 
which it has yet to start building a new strategic partnership. 
Causes of the crisis of the liberal international order
What are the biggest causes of the huge crisis of the liberal international 
order? In his book “The Retreat of Western Liberalism”, Edward Luce cor-
rectly notes that Trump is a symptom of the crisis rather than its cause (Luce, 
2017: 11). Perhaps the strongest causal factor is the crisis of the authority of 
Western powers triggered by several misguided decisions made in the past 
20 years, primarily in the Middle East. 
Starting with Afghanistan, to Iraq and Libya, the Arab spring all the way 
to Syria, the West not only failed to bring long-awaited peace but man-
aged to multiply already existing divisions and problems and ultimately 
brought these problems to its own backyard in the form of millions of 
refugees and many terrorist attacks. These mistaken decisions not only 
questioned the West’s sincerity to help the Arab countries to solve their 
problems but also its competency and ability to do so. All of this brought 
about the biggest authority crisis of the West globally. (Pribićević, 2018b: 
24)
Tony Smith states: “In its transformation from a hegemonic to an impe-
rialist ideology during the 1990s liberal internationalism became the very 
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danger to the values it professed to champion” (Smith, 2017: 232), while 
Monica Toft notes that the USA was engaged in 46 military interventions 
between 1948 and 1991, while from 1992 to 2017 that number increased to 
188 (Toft, 2017). British foreign policy expert Robin Niblett believes that for 
many world countries the USA and its allies are no longer an example to fol-
low (Niblett, 2017: 24). John Mearshamer, adopts a particularly interesting 
viewpoint to the effect that while liberalism is the best political system it is at 
the same time a source of endless foreign policy problems. 
Powerful states that embrace liberal hegemony invariably get themselves 
into serious trouble at home and abroad…. The principal source of the 
problems is that liberalism has an activist mentality woven into its core. 
The belief that all humans have a set of inalienable rights, and that pro-
tecting these rights should override other concerns, creates a powerful 
incentive for liberal states to intervene when other countries – as they 
do on a regular basis – violate their citizens’ rights. (Mearsheimer, 2018: 
218) 
It was Western countries’ Messiah complex, disregarding the tradition 
and culture of Arab countries in the Middle East, to help and democratise 
those people that led to wrong decisions whose consequences are still felt 
today. 
Second, the moment of the West’s triumph also signified the beginning 
of the end of its world domination. Having won the Cold War, the Western 
liberal international order also became the global order to which many states 
acceded, including China, Russia, Eastern Europe and many other countries. 
This has created a totally new situation compared to the previous situation 
when the liberal international order was only made up of Western countries 
which, even in the face of disagreement, were able to come closely together 
around their core values, from liberal democracy to a common foreign pol-
icy led by the USA and NATO. Following the end of the Cold War and the lib-
eral international order becoming a global world order, many other states 
joined in, bringing along their own systems of values, goals and interests. In 
this period, the USA provided “global services – such as security protection 
and support of open markets – which made other states willing to work 
with rather than resist the American pre eminence” (Ikenberry, 2006: 14). 
However, at the start of the 21st century the situation in international rela-
tions began to change with the emergence of issues like terrorism, migra-
tion, climate change, arms proliferation. “One of the deepest starting points 
is that in recent years crisis has developed into a serious structural crisis, 
involving all vital areas of human life in society, including values, social and 
health care, education, culture, politics, environmental issues and others” 
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(Grizold and Svetličič, 2019: 333). It had become ever more difficult for the 
USA and other Western countries to cope with these changes, especially 
since in addition to the crisis of authority these countries began to increas-
ingly face a legitimacy crisis; namely, the third issue triggering the crisis of 
the liberal international order discussed in this article. Joseph Nye notes 
internal reasons that explain the crisis of international liberal order and the 
role of the USA. He claims “America’s place in the world may be threatened 
more by the rise of populist polices at home than the rise of other pow-
ers abroad” (Nye, 2019: 80). Not a great admirer of President Trump’s new 
policies, Elliott Abrams (Abrams, 2019: 133) states: “To many Americans, the 
system that elites ordained for them has come to seem unjust”. 
Unlike in the period after the end of the Second World War when liberal 
democracies together with security enabled their citizens to enjoy the con-
stant growth of living standards and prosperity, this is no longer the case. In 
past 20 years, inequality and poverty have soared in Western democracies, 
principally connected to globalisation of the international order. A book by 
Branko Milanović is often cited here since it clearly shows the biggest win-
ners of globalisation have been workers in China and India whose revenues 
in urban areas have doubled or tripled, as well as the 1 per cent of the world 
wealthiest, while the biggest loser is the middle class in industrial countries 
(Milanović, 2016: 19). Of course, the loss of jobs is also certainly largely due 
to automation processes. The globalisation process in the USA and the UK 
was coupled with growing social inequalities and the meltdown of the mid-
dle class. In the book symbolically entitled “US VS THEM”, Ian Bremmer 
quotes a Pew Research study from December 2015, noting that “after more 
than decades of serving as the nation’s economic majority, the American 
middle class is now matched in number by those in the economic tiers 
above and below it”. Bremmer adds that in “1970 middle-income house-
holds earned 62% of aggregate income in the United States. By 2014, their 
share had fallen to just 43%” (Bremmer, 2018: 16–17). Economic stagnation 
is pronounced in America’s Midwest and in the north of England where old 
industrial centres have been run down while new technologies have been 
unable to create new jobs to fill the void left when big companies departed 
mostly for Asia. It is the discontent of these people in the USA and the UK 
that led Trump and Brexit to success (Pribićević, 2018b: 22). Their anger 
was primarily directed at the illegal workers and immigrants they felt were 
responsible for their economic and social hardship. Alan Abramowitz states 
that “racial resentment was the single strongest predictor for Trump among 
Republican primary voters, although economic and cultural concerns do 
not exclude each other and that Trump explicitly connected these issues 
by arguing that illegal immigrants were taking jobs from American citizens” 
(Abramowitz, 2018: 153). Ian Bremmer shares this view, adding that: “Many 
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Americans believe that some illegal immigrants, willing to work for less, 
take the low wage jobs that working class Americans are trained to do while 
others live off public assistance paid by US taxpayers” (Bremmer, 2018: 20).
Many authors claim that almost all of the progress and revenues made in 
the USA since the 1980s has ended up in the hands of the top 20 per cent of 
the richest (Ikenberry, 2018: 20). For the first time since the Second World 
War, the average American family cannot guarantee that their children will 
be better off than their parents, which has led to the crisis of the legitimacy 
of democracy that is increasingly unable to respond adequately to the issues 
and problems of its citizens (Luce, 2017: 12–13). Things appear even worse 
when we see the regression of democracy in so-called new democracies 
like Turkey, the Philippines and even Poland and Hungary. Many analysts 
believe that nationalism and populism are becoming the guiding ideas and 
ever more citizens hold the view that progress does not equal democracy 
(Diamond, 2019). 
Conclusion
In the end, it remains to be seen what the world order will look like in the 
years to come. By all accounts, it will be much closer to what Mearsheimer 
and other realists claim than to what the advocates of liberalism were hoping 
to achieve: from abandoning the “missionary” role of the USA to promoting 
democracy and ushering in a new concept of illiberal hegemony; espousing 
a policy of protectionism vs free trade; leaving international organisations 
and treaties Trump considered harmful to US interests, including the shak-
ing off of ideological prejudices in relations with Russia. Of course, it is now 
impossible to precisely imagine the future world order although one can 
indicate certain parameters that will surely influence the further develop-
ment of great power relations. According to most assessments, China will 
not be able to replace the USA as a future world leader of a multipolar world 
but the USA will certainly lose its previous position, thereby lowering its 
chances of influencing international politics and shaping the new world 
(Cohen, 2019: 144). Many predict that, instead of seeking to destroy the 
existing order, China will try to increase its influence within it. In fact, China 
is one country that has benefited the most from the current international 
liberal order, especially from globalisation. Yet, despite predictions that per-
haps in the next few decades China’s GDP will overtake that of the USA, in 
terms of per capita income, military power and even less ‘soft power’ such 
expectations do not appear to be realistic. 
The USA’s reduced influence will be impacted by several factors. First, the 
decline in America’s economic power will cause a weakening of its military 
power. Second, turning towards its own problems will certainly diminish 
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Washington’s capability to deal with other states’ problems. Although the 
“America First” slogan itself did not ensure Trump’s 2016 election victory, 
it is a policy that future US presidents will need to embrace while seeking 
to be elected. Third and most importantly, another great 20th century polit-
ical theorist, Aron, noted that a great power loses its strength if it ceases 
to serve an idea. This is exactly what is happening to the USA that became 
leader of the world not only due to its military might but chiefly due to the 
power of the ideas it was advocating that became global following victory 
in the Cold War. By turning to itself and its economic problems at home, the 
USA will cease to be as attractive to other countries and people as before. 
Yet, this does not imply the end of the important role played by the USA 
and its Western allies in world politics. The USA is sure to remain a major 
world power for many years to come, especially since neither Russia nor 
China offer a model for domestic or international relations of appeal to 
other world countries, particularly for those on a higher development level. 
The EU is already the main target for Russia and China, explaining why it 
should stay close to the USA mainly for security and defence reasons. For 
a long time, China has been a major investor and important contributor to 
the UN’s peacekeeping forces in Africa (Šabič and Pejič, 2019: 379), yet it 
can hardly be expected that Chinese policies or even less its internal order 
will be attractive to Latin American or European countries, let alone in Asia 
where India and Japan have a significantly different outlook on interna-
tional relations than Beijing. Hence, it is more realistic to expect the world to 
move in the direction of a new international order with the USA, China and 
Russia as the dominant players, despite Russia being prevented from acting 
as an equal partner as Washington and Beijing due to its economic hard-
ship (Haass, 2019: 30). This gives further support for Mearsheimer’s assess-
ment that China is the only country in the world with the potential to chal-
lenge the USA. However, the question is whether it will be able to realise this 
potential (Mearsheimer, 2018: 229). 
Still, it is not only China and Russia which pose a challenge to Western 
policies at the start of the 21st century. I would even venture to claim that it 
is not the biggest challenge facing the USA and the UK. The greatest chal-
lenge is ideological in nature and concerns the crisis of the liberal policies 
pursued in these countries ever since US President Ronald Reagan and UK 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. While generating great economic growth 
in those countries, at the same time these policies led to growing inequal-
ity and poverty among the working class and former middle class. The 
American Dream and a prosperous Britain are no longer as appealing to 
citizens or the citizens of other countries as they once used to be. People 
around the world, particularly in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, 
perceive the USA and the UK as great powers with mighty weapons but also 
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 57, 2/2020
486
Ognjen PRIBIĆEVIĆ
as countries pursuing the wrong foreign policy and countries with a rising 
number of poor and dissatisfied people. The endless rows of desperate ref-
ugees from Latin America and the Middle East swarming to the USA and the 
EU cannot be the sole criterion for determining how successful these socie-
ties are, let alone for the even less liberal international order that brought 
them to this position. Of course, having said this, we do not at all question 
that, despite all of this, Western countries still offer the best living conditions 
on our planet. 
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